ages in excess of actual losses when it was necessary to punish the defendant and deter such conduct in the future. In a widely cited case, Wilkes v. Wood (1763), the court upheld an exemplary damage award in which little actual harm had occurred. Lord Halifax, Secretary of State to King George II, issued an improper warrant to suppress publication of The North Briton. British officials searched the house of John Wilkes, the publisher, who then sued for "large and exemplary" damages as a means of deterring such conduct. The court awarded 1,000 pounds to Wilkes, which Massey (1995) By the early nineteenth century, English common law allowed a jury to award far greater than the actual money damages to deter improper conduct. Therefore, a court upheld a jury verdict of 500 pounds for trespass. The defendant had been "treading upon plaintiff s grass and hunting for game," though no actual harm occurred. The court observed that "in a case where a man disregards every principle which actuates the conduct of gentlemen, what is to restrain him except large damages?" (Merest v. Harvey 1814).
American Origins
The development of the punitive damages doctrine in the United States followed the English experience. By 1791, an American court instructed the jury prior to its deliberations "not to estimate the damages by any particular proof of suffering, or actual loss, but to give damages for example's sake, to prevent such offenses in the future [emphasis added]" (Coreyell v. Colbaugh 1791; see, also, Genay v. Norris 1784).
By 1851, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages were a well-established common law principle in tort cases that would allow the plaintiff to recover more than compensatory damages alone (Day v. Woodworth 1851). In 1886, that court reaffirmed the principle that tort damages could include not only compensation for direct losses, but also a sum that serves as a "remedy for the greater wrong and injury involved in the apprehension of its repetition" (Barry v. Edmunds 1886).
In addition to these primary objectives of punitive damage awards, courts occasionally have cited other purposes for them. Such damages sometimes are used to dampen a plaintiff's desire to seek revenge, as in Alcorn v. Mitchell (1872) , in which the defendant publicly spit in the plaintiff s face. The court noted that, notwithstanding the minimal degree of actual harm, the act was "one of the greatest indignity, highly provocative of retaliation by force." Liberal damages in such circumstances would preserve "public tranquillity ... [by] ... saving the necessity of resort to personal violence" (Alcorn v. Mitchell 1872).
Other courts have noted that punitive damage awards encourage persons to serve as private attorneys general, protecting society's interest in discouraging serious misconduct by making an example of wrongdoers. The opportunity to obtain such a reward offers an incentive to private parties to pursue the offenders, "especially when the prospective compensatory recovery is low or the expected cost of litigation is high" (Tuttle v. Raymond 1985).
One commentator expanded on this view to characterize punitive damages as a "populist weapon" that historically has served to redress the imbalance of power between monarch and subject, railroad and passenger, or corporation and consumer. He points to consumer fraud and product liability cases as examples of wrongs that otherwise might go unpunished, because the recovery of actual damages alone often would not offset litigation expenses (Massey 1995, p. 18) .
A closely related purpose is to avoid the situation in which compensatory damages alone might serve as a "license" for a defendant to engage in deliberately harmful acts. In Funk v. Kerbaugh (1908) the defendant used unreasonably heavy explosive charges during railroad construction, knowing they would cause harm to the plaintiffs house and barn. Despite the plaintiffs request that he use lighter charges so as not to continue the harm, the defendant persisted, knowing that it would be cheaper to pay compensatory damages than to delay construction. A punitive damage award prevented the defendant from benefiting by his deliberately wrongful act.
Contemporary Role of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages serve two primary purposes in contemporary society: to punish wrongdoers and deter similar behavior in the future. The punishment function is obvious in that the defendant is required to pay moneys beyond what is necessary to compensate the victim for the damages he or she suffered. The punitive award must be large enough to cause financial pain to the defendant; hence, the award is likely to vary depending on the wealth of the defendant. The deterrence function comes about because of the example set by the punitive award. This defendant, as well as others who might be considering the same behavior, are presumably deterred by the knowledge that they too will be punished severely if they behave like the defendant. Most jurisdictions mention both rationales when imposing punitive awards (Dragutsky 1994, p. 919) .
Punitive damages originated in response to intentional misconduct: behavior known in advance to be wrong and harmful. With the use of punitive damages in product liability litigation, the standard has changed to include gross negligence and maliciousness. Therefore, the intent-to-harm component is no longer required. In addition, punitive damages are now awarded in mass tort litigation; hence; one defendant can be liable for punitive damages many times for the same offense. Punitive damages even are awarded occa-sionally in contract cases (Schwartz and As the data in Table 1 The GAO (1989) studied two years' worth of trials in five states and also interviewed attorneys after the trials were completed. The GAO opined that punitive awards "were neither routine nor excessively large" (Rustad 1992, p. 28). The GAO also found that punitive awards were reduced substantially in settlement conferences and because of posttrial appeals. Landes and Posner (1986) examined two years of reported product liability cases at the trial and federal appellate court levels and found that punitive damages were granted in 10 of 172 cases. The punitive awards survived intact in 1 case, were reduced in 3 others, and were reversed and remanded in the remaining 6 cases (Landes and Posner 1986, p. 35).
In the context of the controversy surrounding punitive damages, the U.S. Supreme Court has dealt with this topic several times in the past decade. We now review the five significant punitive damages decisions rendered by the Data are derived from a 1/2/97 search of the Lexis (1997) database of reported cases. The Search 1 phrase is "punitive damage(s) (within 255 words of) product liability or strict liability" for each year. The Search 2 phrase is "product liability and (punitive or exemplary) (within 2 words of) damage(s)" for each year. These data somewhat overstate the incidence of punitive awards in recent years because not every case including the search phrases involves a punitive award. In some cases the court could be discussing a prior verdict whose central feature was a dispute over punitive damages. In any event, the percentage of cases discussing punitive damages is quite small. For example, in 1995 punitive damages were mentioned in 2253 out of more than 70,000 reported federal cases. Of the 2253, only 168 involved product liability or strict liability.
Supreme Court since this topic was last examined in detail in the marketing literature (see Morgan 1989) . Table 2 contains a summary of the punitive damages issues in these cases.
Recent Supreme Court Decisions Involving Punitive Damages
We provide greater detail in our discussion of the BMW case because the others have been analyzed in considerable detail in the legal and business periodical literature. In TXO the Court essentially passed on an opportunity to develop clear and convincing guidelines for assessing whether punitive damages were assessed according to acceptable procedures (see, e.g., Sperow 1994; Stuart 1994). The Court implicitly found that the procedural due process from Haslip-that is, proper jury instructions, adequate trial court review, and adequate appellate court review-should govern states' systems of determining punitive damages. The Court also indicated that the Haslip procedures were not minimum acceptable levels because the Court approved less restrictive due process procedures in TXO. The punitive to compensatory ratio of 526:1 convincingly surpassed the 4:1 Haslip ratio.
Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal (1989)

Honda Motor v. Oberg (1994)
Here the plaintiff was riding a three-wheeled all-terrain (ATV) vehicle produced and sold by the defendant. While driving up a steep hill, the plaintiff was severely and permanently injured when the ATV overturned onto him. Oberg sued Honda, arguing that it should have known that the ATV was unreasonably and inherently dangerous. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded him $5 million in punitive damages and $939,390 in compensatory damages, the latter reduced 20% because of the plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Honda appealed, arguing that its rights under the Due 
BMW v. Gore (1996)
Ira Gore bought a black BMW sedan in January 1990 from an authorized BMW dealer in Birmingham, Ala. He drove the car for about nine months before taking it to a car detailer in order to improve its appearance. Slick, the detailer, noticed signs that the car had been repainted and mentioned this to Gore. Parts of the vehicle---quarter panels, top, hood, and trunk-had been repainted at BMW's facility in Georgia. Hearing this, Gore believed he had been cheated and sued BMW of North America, the American distributor of BMW automobiles, the German manufacturer, and the local dealership. Gore claimed that BMW's failure to tell him that the car had been repainted constituted fraud-that is, suppression of a material fact.
BMW had implemented a nationwide policy in 1983 of repairing vehicles damaged during manufacture or transport. If the cost of repair was 3% or less of the car's suggested retail price, BMW sold the cars as new without informing its dealers. If repair costs exceeded 3%, the cars were placed in company service for a while and then sold as used. The cost to repair Gore's care was $601.37, approximately 1.5% of its $40,000+ retail price. BMW asserted that the repaired car was as good as a new one. BMW believed a punitive award was improper because of its good-faith belief that it had no duty to disclose this minor repair to Gore.
Gore claimed that having the car repainted lessened its value by approximately 10%; hence, he asked for compensatory damages of $4,000. He also included evidence that BMW had sold 983 refinished cars since 1983 without disclosing that they had been repainted. On the basis of the damage estimate of $4,000 per vehicle, Gore asked for punitive damages of $4 million, the approximate value of the total excess price charged by BMW. The jury in the Alabama state court returned a verdict favoring Gore over BMW of North America in the amount of $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages.
BMW filed several post-trial motions, including a claim that its nondisclosure policy was acceptable in more than 20 states. Some states mandated disclosure of repairs exceeding 3% of the suggested retail price, but none required disclosure of lesser repairs (BMW v. Gore 1996). BMW also noted that its nondisclosure policy had not been challenged before this lawsuit was filed, thus making punitive damages an overly severe penalty. Before this judgment was delivered, BMW changed its policy to avoid sales of refinished cars in Alabama and two other states. After the verdict, BMW instituted a nationwide policy of full disclosure of all repairs.
The trial court denied all of BMW's motions. The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive award was not excessive in terms of constitutionally permitted limits. This courts did determine that the trial court was incorrect in calculating punitive damages on the basis of the number of refinished autos sold in jurisdictions other than Alabama. The punitive award was reduced to $2 million, though the court did not present any reasoning for choosing this amount.
The U.S. Supreme Court, using traditional reasoning for invoking punitive damages, declared the $2 million to be grossly excessive in terms of the state's interest in punishment and deterrence. The Court mentioned three guidelines for assessing damages (BMW v. Gore 1996):
1. the degree of reprehensibility, 2. the ratio of the punitive damage award to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff, and 3. the state's sanctions for comparable misconduct.
This case seemed to have been decided on the first guideline. Gore suffered only minor economic damages because he purchased an automobile that had been refinished. He was not seriously injured or physically harmed in any way. Although this case marks the first time in decades that a punitive award has been overturned, the decision did little to guide legislatures crafting statutes to clarify punitive damages guidelines (Pappas 1996) .
Public Policy Issues Emerging from Supreme Court Decisions Computing the Punitive Award
The basic public policy question is whether punitive damages should be limited in some sense: an absolute amount, in relationship to compensatory damages, or as a percentage of the defendant's financial situation. A related question is whether punitive damages would continue to function as a punishment and deterrent if some limitation is approved.
An absolute dollar limit makes punitive damages predictable for purposes of decision making. A company pondering an unlawful act, for example, concealing known product dangers through failure to warn, will be able to quantify the possible punitive damages exposure. If the profits from the proposed concealment are large enough, the anticipated punitive penalty will not deter the behavior. This outcome defeats the fundamental deterrence purpose of punitive damages (see Partlett 1996) .
Tying punitive damages to compensatory damages also diminishes the effectiveness of punitive damages. Proposals of this type have surfaced several times in recent years, typically calling for punitive to compensatory ratios of 2:1 or 3:1 (see, e.g., Diveley 1995 Several states already have developed limits for punitive awards. Diveley (1995, p. 31) notes that more than a dozen states have enacted legislation to curb punitive damages. The typical statute specifies an absolute limit, usually $250,000 or two or three times the compensatory amount, whichever is less. Alabama, which has a notorious history of punitive awards, has the following: s6-11-21. Punitive damages not to exceed $250,000; an award of punitive damages shall not exceed $250,000, unless it is based upon one or more of the following: Calculating punitive damages on the basis of the defendant's wealth would allow defendants to anticipate punitive awards. Even so, the prospect of a substantial punitive penalty would still act as a deterrent. Allowing the defendant's wealth into the formula for punitive damages is a controversial step (Abraham and Jeffries 1989). The plaintiff's bar generally supports this view, whereas the defense bar opposes it. Commentators have suggested a compromise in that wealth would not be used to establish the punitive award but instead would be used to judge whether the award was excessive after it was set (see, e.g., Kirgis 1993; Schwartz and Behrens 1993). This suggestion seems to overlook both punishment and deterrence goals. Without knowing whether the punitive award actually was going to harm the defendant financially, the jury would not know the appropriate level of punishment. If punitive damages are to be limited in some manner, we support a percentage limit, rather than an absolute limit, on the defendant's wealth. Such laws have come into being partially in response to the criticism that punitive awards represent an undeserved windfall to plaintiffs and actually could encourage litigation (see, e.g., Schwartz 1988). To better serve the punishment and deterrence goals, society at large should share in the punitive award rather than just the plaintiff who already recovers through compensatory damages. Such statutes also raise certain difficulties, such as when litigants reach a settlement exceeding the compensatory request, but less than the sum of the compensatory plus punitive request. How is the settlement apportioned among attorney fees, compensatory damages, and punitive damages?
Constitutional Issues
The Due Process Clause was addressed in Pacific Mutual v. Haslip (1991, p. 18):
We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. We can say, however, that general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus.
The Court has not articulated what amounts to proper due process; however, the Court did note that Alabama had developed seven useful criteria to assess the adequacy of a punitive award (Haslip 1991, pp. 21-22):
1. Whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred; 2. The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; 3. The profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of having the defendant also sustain a loss; 4. The "financial position" of the defendant; 5. All the costs of litigation; 6. The imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and 7. The existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.
If we add to this list a mandatory post-trial review of the punitive award by the trial court and a set of jury instructions that explains the role of punitive damages, we have a workable list of due process guarantees. The appeals process provides for another level of review.
Other Procedural Issues
Procedural precaution is the key to preserving punitive damages as a viable punishment and deterrent. The punishment aspect of punitive damages is a criminal concept, and criminal law employs substantial protection of the defendant's due process rights (Forward 1993 Concern for standard of proof has led to recommendations that trials involving punitive damages requests be bifurcated. The first part of the trial would be the determination of the defendant's culpability and the appropriate compensatory award. The second part would deal with the punitive damages question and its related higher level of proof. Experts contend that this approach would prevent evidence related to the punitive award from biasing the jury's overall assessment of guilt and compensatory damages (Comment 1996; Schwartz and Behrens 1996).
Marketing Implications
The guideline, "Do not intentionally harm consumers," captures the essence of proper marketing behavior; however, this standard provides nothing in the way of managerial action implications. Timely communication of information is the key to avoiding situations in which consumers have been injured by faulty products in a manner meriting punitive damages. During the product development process, a product's dangerous propensities should be cataloged and regularly brought to the attention of managers. Knowledge of these hazardous properties arises during in-house design sessions, through marketing testing of prototypes, and eventually from customer feedback about usage situations. Salespeople are another valuable source of safety information because of their regular contact with customers.
A company has two choices in terms of dealing with unsafe features or perilous in-use situations. It can design away the problems or provide warnings to consumers about the potential dangers. Design solutions are clearly superior to warnings because the former eliminate the danger, whereas warnings rely on consumers to read, process, and heed warnings. The use of warnings shifts safety responsibility from marketers to consumers who could ignore (distracted or busy users) or misunderstand (complex language, illiteracy, or language barriers) warnings. We believe that permitting such shifting of responsibility to consumers constitutes unacceptable public policy. Warnings should be used only if dangers cannot be designed out of products or if the dangers are an inherent part of useful products (e.g., hammers, power tools).
Given known dangers, marketers must convey this information to consumers, especially information in the company's possession prior to marketing the product. Conscious failure to warn of known dangers is tantamount to inviting punitive damages claims. The entire communications program should focus on transmitting the seriousness of known dangers. Print and broadcast advertisements should include disclosures about the dangers, though such disclosures can reduce the impact of advertisements. In addition, ad content should not encourage or imply unsafe product use, particularly use that stretches a product to the limits of its design. Likewise, salespeople should not mitigate the impact of warnings by their statements to prospects and customers during sales calls. Salesperson statements that are wrong or intentionally misleading readily could lead to a punitive damages award.
The final step in eliminating punitive awards is to have a recall program in place so that it can be implemented quickly if necessary. Recall programs, by necessity, immediately remove dangerous products from consumers' hands. When the company hears about product users being hurt by a product and then decides to recall the item, it is too late to develop the recall program. An effective, planned recall program is also a signal that a company is concerned about consumer safety, a good position to be in if punitive damages litigation arises.
Conclusion
Although the constitutional arguments have not been debated fully by the Supreme Court, the Court at least has indicated that it is going to examine procedural due process in cases involving disputes about punitive damages. Therefore, over time, the Court's position on due process will evolve, albeit perhaps slowly. States therefore should concentrate on developing concrete laws governing jury instructions about assessing punitive damages, trial court review of jury decisions, appellate review of trial court results, and State Supreme Courts' reviews of appellate adjudication. Developing specific guidelines is well beyond the scope of this analysis; however, the Court clearly has indicated that such procedures are necessary.
Legislative action is preferred over intermittent Supreme Court decisions. Courts, by the nature of their function, see the specific facts of a case and any precedent brought into the courtroom. Moreover, courts at different levels or circuits could disagree on how to apply Supreme Court decisions to cases involving similar fact situations. Analysis of recent post BMW cases suggests that federal courts more than state courts are cutting punitive damage awards (MacLachlan 1997). Legislatures have access to much more information, such as experts on all sides of an issue, reviews of all relevant litigation both within and outside the state, and a sense of the preferences of the citizens. All of this provides a useful backdrop for punitive damages reform that accommodates divergent views.
